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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2214 
___________ 
 
HYON HUI SCOUTEN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-02084) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on January 19, 2018 
 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 22, 2018 ) 
   
 
O P I N I O N*
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Hyon Hui Scouten appeals the District Court’s judgment affirming the 
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits 
under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
As the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recounted in detail, 
Scouten claims disability based on physical impairments, such as compression fractures 
of the thoracic and lumbar spine and knee pain, and the mental impairment of depression.  
In September 2012, Scouten filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging 
a disability onset date of April 15, 2007.  After the Social Security Administration denied 
her application, Scouten requested a hearing before an ALJ.   
Applying the sequential evaluation process under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)–(g), the 
ALJ determined that Scouten was not disabled at any time from the alleged onset date 
through December 31, 2011, the date she was last insured.  The ALJ found that Scouten’s 
compression fractures and knee pain were severe physical impairments but that she did 
not have a severe mental impairment.  The ALJ further found that Scouten had the 
residual functional capacity to perform light work and that she could perform jobs that 
existed in significant numbers in the national economy.  Based on these findings, the ALJ 
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determined that Scouten was not disabled and therefore not eligible for disability 
benefits.   
After the Appeals Council denied Scouten’s request for review of the ALJ’s 
decision, Scouten sought review in the District Court, which affirmed the 
Commissioner’s determination.  This appeal followed. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over all legal issues, Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 
857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995), but we must accept the ALJ’s factual findings if supported by 
substantial evidence, Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” or “such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
III. Discussion 
Scouten raises four arguments in support of her contention that the determination 
of the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence.  None is persuasive. 
First, Scouten argues that the ALJ did not give enough weight to the opinion of her 
treating primary physician, Dr. Prince, that she had a limited physical capacity and could 
not sit or stand for more than three hours a day.  We disagree.  A treating source’s 
opinion is not entitled to controlling weight if it is “inconsistent with the other substantial 
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evidence in [the] case record.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).  The ALJ considered Dr. 
Prince’s opinion, which was offered after the date Scouten was last insured, and found it 
inconsistent with the physician’s contemporaneous medical records from the relevant 
period indicating Scouten’s normal gait and strength, full range of motion, and intact 
sensation.  The ALJ was entitled to consider the complete medical record and to place 
greater reliance on the contemporaneous entries than on the doctor’s later, inconsistent 
opinion.  See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 430. 
Second, Scouten challenges the ALJ’s finding that her depression was not a severe 
impairment, asserting that the ALJ improperly credited a non-examining psychological 
consultant over her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Berger.  Yet, because Dr. Berger’s opinion, 
like Dr. Prince’s, was inconsistent with her medical records and was based on a short 
treatment history that began well after the date she was last insured, the ALJ was entitled 
to give the opinion limited weight.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (explaining that the 
weight given to a medical opinion depends on factors including the “[l]ength of the 
treatment relationship,” the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship,” and the 
opinion’s “[c]onsistency . . . with the record as a whole”).  Even accepting, as Scouten 
contends, that the consultant’s opinion was based on an incomplete record, the ALJ 
himself did consider the complete record and determined that it was consistent with the 
consultant’s conclusion, and the ALJ, not physicians or consultants, must make the 
ultimate disability determinations.  See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 
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361 (3d Cir. 2011).  Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s finding that Scouten did 
not have a severe mental impairment is supported by substantial evidence. 
Third, Scouten challenges the ALJ’s finding that her own testimony was only 
partially credible.  The ALJ considered Scouten’s testimony about the intensity, 
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms but found that the objective medical 
evidence—which revealed routine, conservative, and limited treatment—was inconsistent 
with the severity of her assertions.  Substantial evidence therefore supports the ALJ’s 
finding that Scouten’s testimony was only partially credible.  See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 
F.3d 113, 130 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Finally, Scouten argues that the ALJ, without proper explanation, failed to credit 
her husband’s testimony, but again, the record demonstrates otherwise.  The ALJ 
discussed Scouten’s husband’s testimony in detail, and then considered the other 
evidence in the record, including Scouten’s MRI results and contemporaneous treatment 
records, that undermined his testimony.  In light of this comprehensive review, we are 
satisfied that the ALJ fulfilled his “duty to hear and evaluate all relevant evidence.”  
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3). 
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Scouten’s disability claim. 
